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The Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic
Domestic Politics Back with a Vengeance
DAVID CADIER
The Czech Republic is facing,  today, a more challenging international en­vironment and a more pressuring Eu ro pean context that it has ever expe­
rienced since its accession to the EU in 2004 or, even, its return to in de pen­
dence in 1989. The international normative and  legal  orders are increasingly 
contested by the rising ambitions of new powers and by the return of nation­
alist tendencies across the board. In the United States, which since 1989 had 
been regarded by Czech elites as providing both a strategic compass and a 
cultural model for they own country, the new president has expressed views 
on NATO and Rus sia that are antithetic to Czech Republic’s long­ held posi­
tions. The EU and Rus sia are profoundly at odds with each other since the 
outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, and Prague is said to be one of the targets of 
Moscow’s attempts to influence the internal politics of member states. The 
EU has itself been confronted by several internal  trials, such as terrorist at­
tacks, the rise of pop u lism, the refugee crisis, and the exit of the United 
Kingdom (which was regarded in Prague as a like­ minded country inside 
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the bloc). The Eu ro pean context is not only challenging but also pressuring, 
in the sense that the EU integration proj ect very much stands at a crossroads 
and individual member states  will have to make decisive choices in this re­
gard. Germany and especially France are pushing for deeper integration 
around the eurozone core, and the prospect of a “multi­ speed Eu rope” (with 
countries having dif fer ent status and levels of integration) is becoming more 
likely. The Czech Republic is not a member of the eurozone, and its popula­
tion remains widely opposed to adopting the common currency, but its high 
de pen dency on Germany in terms of trade and investments also means 
that remaining outside of  these new integration frameworks—if they 
materialize— could turn out to be costly for its domestic economy. The 
Czech Republic teamed up with its Central Eu ro pean partners from the 
Visegrad Group in refusing to take in refugees and in rejecting the reloca­
tion quotas previously agreed on at the EU level by member states. In re­
sponse, the EU Commission has launched an infringement procedure 
against Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.1 At the same time 
though, on topics other than migration, Prague has been— like Bratislava— 
wary to avoid being too closely associated with the populist governments in 
power in Warsaw and Budapest, which find themselves in open confronta­
tion with the EU institutions over their domestic reforms eroding the rule 
of law. As all  these examples illustrate, Czech foreign policy  faces significant 
challenges and dilemmas; it very much finds itself at a critical juncture.
Anticipating Czech Republic’s choices in this context appears particu­
larly difficult, however. No clear direction has emerged in Czech foreign 
policy over the past years; if anything, this policy has in fact often been 
characterized by its indetermination and paralysis, mainly due to po liti cal 
infighting.2 As emphasized by a former se nior Czech diplomat, who served 
in the EU Commission and as ambassador to NATO, the “ambiguity of 
Czech positions” weakens the country and  causes “unease among its allies 
over the extent to which it can be relied upon.”3 This sense of confusion is 
only reinforced by the fact that some of Prague’s recent decisions go in the 
opposite direction of what had come to constitute the country’s traditional 
foreign policy stance since 1989. The previous emphasis on  human rights 
and democracy promotion, which had for long constituted a defining fea­
ture of Czech foreign policy, is increasingly being replaced by a more prag­
matic and trade­ oriented approach: While the Czech Republic used to be 
known as the staunchest critic of the Cuba regime in the EU, it recently 
singularized itself by being the only EU country that kept its embassy open 
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in Syria and even somehow improved its trade relations with the Syrian re­
gime of Bashar al­ Assad in spite of the war raging in the country. Simi­
larly, while two presidents of the Czech Republic, Václav Havel and Václav 
Klaus, had cultivated privileged relations with Washington, the former re­
garding the United States as a po liti cal model and the latter as an economic 
one, current Czech President Miloš Zeman came to ban the U.S. ambas­
sador from Prague  Castle in April 2015  after he had criticized Zeman for 
being the only EU leader to attend the World War II commemorations in 
Moscow. Fi nally, following an opposite evolution than that of the EU 
mainstream, the Czech Republic stood among the member states wishing 
to impose sanctions on Rus sia  after the Russo­ Georgian War of 2008 and 
among  those rather reluctant to impose them following Rus sia’s 2014 in­
tervention in Ukraine, although Moscow’s responsibility in the outbreak 
of the latter conflict was much greater than in the former.
This evolution prompts the following questions: What drives Czech for­
eign policy and what prompted the changes noted above in par tic u lar? Are 
 these changes the mark of a profound change of direction in Czech foreign 
policy or simply punctual contradictions resulting from domestic politics 
spilling over into foreign policy? What are Prague’s diplomatic priorities 
and foreign policy preferences at the EU level? How is the Czech Republic 
likely to position itself in the changing international and Eu ro pean con­
texts? This chapter purports to shed some light on  these questions by con­
trasting Czech foreign policy then and now. It begins by presenting the his­
torical background, domestic sources, and past traditions in this policy. It 
then focuses in turn on three issue areas of key importance for Prague in 
EU foreign policy— namely, relations with the United States, relations with 
Rus sia, and policies  toward the Eastern neighborhood— and traces the evo­
lution of Czech positions on  these dossiers. The conclusion summarizes the 
findings and discusses the likely  future direction of Czech foreign policy.
Historical Background, Domestic Context,  
and Czech Foreign Policy Traditions
In 1989,  after de cades of seeing its foreign policy determined by outside 
 factors, the Czech Republic was led to radically rethink its foreign policy 
in a peculiar regional context. The collapse of the bipolar geopo liti cal con­
figuration left a security vacuum in Central Eu rope, a heterogeneous 
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region that had been embedded in the frame of successive empires ( whether 
Habsburg or Soviet). To protect and consolidate their newly regained 
statehood, the Czech Republic and other Central Eu ro pean countries have 
strived to anchor in the novel continental architecture in which the EU and 
NATO served as the two pillars. In the 1990s, Czech foreign policy was 
almost exclusively devoted to joining  these two organ izations.
The pro cess of laying the foundation for a new foreign policy coincided 
domestically with a period of national reconstruction. The strategic need 
to anchor the country in regional security structures, and the ontological 
need to reestablish the state in its Western identity, came together in the 
“return to Eu rope” paradigm. The Czech Republic did return to Eu rope 
eventually by completing its accession to both NATO in 1999 and the EU 
in 2004. As such, it achieved the overarching foreign policy objective that 
monopolized its attention and resources for fifteen years. This irremedia­
bly created a void in Czech foreign policy thinking. As the po liti cal class 
grew disinterested in— and largely tuned away from— foreign policy  matters 
once  these memberships had been achieved, this void has been filled by a 
small number of foreign policy entrepreneurs, who  shaped the diplomatic 
course of the country.
Two figures have dominated Czech politics in the two de cades follow­
ing the return to in de pen dence: Václav Havel and Václav Klaus. Havel, who 
served as president from 1989 to 2003  after having been the leader of the 
dissidence (the underground intellectual opposition movement to the com­
munist regime), played a crucial role in molding the ideological basis of 
Czech foreign policy. His aura facilitated relations with Western powers 
and institutions. He made foreign policy his domaine reserve, and he did not 
hesitate to impose his own choices, even sometimes against public opinion 
or government members’ positions, on the topic of reconciliation with Ger­
many. Havel’s imprint has been profound and perennial,  because he and 
his advisers essentially laid the foundations of the country’s foreign policy 
(and oversaw it through most of the 1990s). Translating dissidents’ philos­
ophy into international relations, he established, for instance, the  human 
rights and democracy promotion pillar in Czech foreign policy.4 It became 
a cornerstone of Czech diplomacy that was promoted as a specialization at 
the EU level.5 Havel’s foreign policy positions should not simply be summed 
up to this aspect, however, as is too often done. He was also a convinced 
Atlanticist and a firm believer in the Eu ro pean proj ect.
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This last aspect in par tic u lar distinguishes him from the other promi­
nent po liti cal figure of that period, Václav Klaus, who was prime minister 
between 1993 and 1997 and then president from 2003 to 2013. Klaus 
manifested much less interest in foreign policy and, one could add, less 
diplomatic abilities. Nevertheless,  because he had a durable impact on the 
Czech po liti cal debate, installing notably at its core a strong attachment to 
the  free market economic model and a sense of sovereign exceptionalism 
feeding a skeptical attitude  toward the EU integration pro cess, he influ­
enced the domestic context in which foreign policy was formulated, as well 
as the country’s international image. This is true not just about his ideo­
logical orientation but also his governing practice: Klaus was known for 
using the presidential springboard to voice his personal views in a pro­
vocative manner. He did not hesitate, for instance, to draw a comparison 
between the EU and the old Soviet Union inside the Eu ro pean Parliament 
or to travel to conferences abroad to promote his book refuting climate 
change theories. As  will be illustrated below, his successor, President Miloš 
Zeman, has  adopted a comparable maverick posture in foreign policy 
since he took office.
In the 2000s, a third group of foreign policy entrepreneurs came to oc­
cupy key positions in the Czech foreign policy system.  These entrepreneurs 
could be designated as Atlanticists (they  were also sometimes referred to as 
“hawks” in the Czech debate). In addition to a strong pro­ American orien­
tation and a critical stance  toward Rus sia, they assumed the democracy pro­
motion agenda from Havel and reproduced Klaus’s lukewarm approach to 
the EU. So cio log i cally, this group is mainly composed of former dissidents 
who have turned hawkish as well as policymakers who specialize in strate­
gic affairs. Both strands had been socialized to American worldviews in the 
1990s and enjoy strong links with the U.S. epistemic and policymaking 
communities. The leading figure of this group, Alexandr Vondra, minister 
for Eu ro pean affairs between 2007 and 2009 and minister of defense be­
tween 2010 and 2012, fits both profiles: He is a former member of Charter 
77 and was ambassador to the United States around the time of NATO 
accession. This group’s imprint was notably manifest on certain key deci­
sions in the 2000s— such as support for the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
participation in the Ballistic Missile Defense scheme conceived by the 
George W. Bush administration, or the tough reaction to the Russo­ Georgian 
conflict of 2008— that led the Czech Republic to be closer, in EU foreign 
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policy debates, to Poland and the Baltic states than to Slovakia and Hungary. 
The influence of the Atlanticists progressively decreased  after the early 
2000s, however, due to generational change and as a new Social Demo cratic 
government that came into power in 2014, sidelining some key figures.
In examining the domestic context, it is impor tant indeed to distinguish 
between the foreign policy elite and the po liti cal class. The latter is rather 
inconsistent and largely inconsequential in terms of foreign policy doctrine, 
but it affects foreign policy practice nonetheless. International issues rank 
very low on parties’ and politicians’ agendas; they occasionally pick on some 
issues to score points in the domestic po liti cal debate but rarely articulate 
a coherent vision in international affairs. In the 2000s, the two main 
parties— the Civic Demo cratic Party (ODS) and the Czech Social Demo­
cratic Party (ČSSD)— have  adopted declamatory postures when in the op­
position but have, by and large, followed similar foreign policy lines when 
in government. Similarly, ANO, a party that emerged in the early 2010s 
and entered government by forming a co ali tion with the ČSSD following 
the 2013 legislative elections, did not have any section on foreign policy in 
its program. Václav Klaus, the former president, and Miloš Zeman, the cur­
rent president, have further complicated the picture by voicing singular 
views and adopting stances antagonistic to the government. Overall, the 
strategic course of the country in international affairs has long been set by 
the foreign policy elite while domestic politics mainly played a mediating 
role, by derailing, paralyzing, or boosting specific policies. For instance, the 
two preferences that have been installed at the heart of Czech foreign pol­
icy  after 1989, Atlanticism and democracy promotion, have been mainly 
pushed by the foreign policy and strategic elites but not endorsed to the 
same extent by the po liti cal class or public opinion.  After 2013, however, 
divisions within the party leading the governing co ali tion, the ČSSD, and 
the growing influence of other po liti cal actors with populist inclinations 
led foreign policy to be overtaken by domestic politics. The ČSSD found 
itself consumed by po liti cal infighting between its pro­ European faction 
and its members advocating a more sovereign and conservative orientation.6 
Two po liti cal figures capitalized on this situation and filled the rhetorical 
gap on international affairs: Zeman, who himself is a former member of 
ČSSD and retains a power of nuisance in the party, and Andrej Babiš, the 
current prime minister and leader of ANO, the party that won the legisla­
tive elections of October 2017. Both politicians resorted to populist strate­
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gies and discourse—in the context of the refugee crisis in particular— that 
led for the foreign policy elites to be less audible.
Significant actors and Regional Focus:  
The Case of the United States
Among non­ EU actors, the United States is by far the most significant for 
the Czech Republic. Maintaining a strong and functional transatlantic link 
has been the cardinal priority of Czech foreign policy since the 1990s, pur­
sued within multilateral frameworks such as the EU and NATO, as well as 
through constant endeavors to upgrade bilateral ties with Washington 
where pos si ble. Throughout the 2000s, the Czech Republic stood out as 
one of the staunchest Atlanticists in Eu rope, with successive governments 
not hesitating to go against public opinion in supporting U.S. policies. In 
more recent years, Czech Atlanticism has become much less vocal but re­
mains largely unquestioned.
A sustained American military presence in Eu rope has long been seen 
by Czech policymakers as a way out of the geopo liti cal dilemma that placed 
the country between two overly power ful neighbors (Germany and Rus­
sia) and that, historically, often determined the fate of their country. Czech 
support for the U.S. campaign in Iraq, a region beyond its traditional zone 
of geopo liti cal interest, can be understood in  these terms. The rationale was 
to follow the Americans in the  Middle East in order to try to preserve U.S. 
involvement in  Middle Eu rope.7 Yet Prague’s allegiance to Washington does 
not derive solely from security considerations: A significant share of the 
country’s elite regard the United States as a po liti cal and economic model. 
Washington is also praised for its role in pushing for the Czech Republic’s 
integration into NATO and for its proactive democracy promotion agenda. 
In other words, for Czech foreign policy elites, Atlanticism has been nor­
mative and not just strategic. This was notably manifest in the discussions 
around the Czech Republic’s participation in the U.S. Ballistic Missile De­
fense (BMD) proj ect envisaged by the Bush administration. In the early to 
mid­2000s, the Czech Republic and Poland  were to participate in the Bush 
administration’s plan for a third BMD site by hosting on their soil a radar 
station and ten interceptor missiles, respectively. The first negotiations 
began in 2002, they became official in 2007, and in the summer of 2008 
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the first agreements  were signed.8 For the Czech foreign policy elites, their 
country’s participation in the BMD system amounted to an upgrade of its 
strategic status: The opportunity to get even a few American boots on 
Czech soil was welcomed as an additional security guarantee. But some of 
the advocates of the proj ect also cast it in identity terms, presenting it as a 
way to strengthen the country’s anchor in the Euro­ Atlantic civilization as 
well as its Western identity. In fact, Prague did not ask for any material com­
pensation in return for hosting the BMD and seemed content merely with 
the opportunity to strengthen its alliance with Washington. This clearly 
contrasted with Poland’s utilitarian and business­ minded approach to the 
BMD negotiation. The domestic opposition to the proj ect was much smaller 
in Poland than in the Czech Republic, and thus it should have been easier 
to sell internally. Yet, Warsaw asked for much more from Washington in 
return for hosting components of the system, such as financial and technical 
assistance in modernizing its army and the deployment of several Patriot 
missiles on its territory. In other words, in contrast to the Czech stance, 
Polish Atlanticism seemed more strategic than normative.9
In the Czech Republic, the foreign policy and security elites, the center­ 
right parties of the governing co ali tion, and the mainstream media  were 
overall supportive of their country’s participation to the BMD system. The 
majority of the population, an active share of civil society, and po liti cal par­
ties outside government  were opposed to it, however. The ČSSD, which 
was the main opposition party at the time, deci ded to capitalize on popu lar 
discontent; contrary to most foreign policy issues in this period, what came 
to be designated in Czech debates as the “radar” thus became heavi ly 
politicized.
This party and other opponents from both the po liti cal class and civil 
society criticized the BMD proj ect for unnecessarily putting the Czech Re­
public at risk and for encroaching on its sovereignty. Opposition parties 
delayed the ratification of the July 2008 agreement in the lower  house of 
parliament, where the governing parties did not have a majority. In Sep­
tember 2009, anyway, the new U.S. administration of President Barack 
Obama announced that it was dropping the proj ect in light of its financial 
cost and technical uncertainties.
For this decision and other features of its positioning in international 
affairs (such as the ‘reset’ with Rus sia or the “pivot” to Asia), the Atlanti­
cist coterie in the Czech Republic largely resented the foreign policy of the 
Obama administration for it was not corresponding to their preestablished 
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ideological conceptions. This tran spired in the “Open Letter to the Obama 
Administration” of July 2009, signed by preeminent po liti cal figures from 
Central and Eastern Eu rope, including Alexandr Vondra and Karel Schwar­
zenberg, who had been the two most influential decisionmakers in Czech 
foreign policy since Václav Havel.10 The text bemoaned “that Central and 
Eastern Eu ro pean countries  were no longer at the heart of American for­
eign policy” and warned against taking the region’s stability and Atlanti­
cist inclination for granted. In other words, the initial reaction of Czech 
foreign policy elites to Obama’s attempt to “normalize” relations with 
Central Europe— that is, to bring  those relations in line with the region’s 
geopo liti cal value for U.S. international strategy— was to criticize the new 
stance rather than try to adapt to it. This tends, again, to emphasize the 
normative (or ideological) rather than strategic texture of their Atlanticist 
stance. The text was not explic itly endorsed by the caretaker government in 
power in Prague at the time and was criticized by many Czech analysts, but 
its publication and the cancellation of the BMD plan affected Czech­ U.S. 
relations for several months.
In light of the party’s previous positions, questions lingered as to how 
much the ČSSD­ led government, which took office in January 2014, would 
affect Czech policies  toward the United States. Overall, while seeking to 
distinguish itself from the legacy of po liti cal figures such as Vondra and 
Schwarzenberg, the new team did not fundamentally put into question the 
country’s transatlantic leaning. In the context of the debate on the “strate­
gic reassurance” to be provided to NATO’s Eastern members following 
Rus sia’s actions in Ukraine, Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka made remarks 
that clearly contrasted with earlier goals pursued through participation in 
the BMD proj ect. He declared that, contrary to Poland or the Baltic states, 
the Czech Republic was not calling for a reinforcement of NATO military 
presence on its territory or in Eu rope more generally.11 The statement 
must in part be read as a posturing move in domestic politics rather than 
as a genuine foreign policy orientation, however: It was rather inconse­
quential at the strategic level  because such deployment was not contem­
plated by the Atlantic alliance anyway and was mainly seeking to echo the 
public’s deep­ rooted aversion to the stationing of foreign troops on national 
soil. In fact, many internal po liti cal actors criticized this declaration, in­
cluding President Zeman, who is not positioning himself as an Atlanticist.12 
What is more, a few months  later, while preparing for an official visit 
to Washington, Sobotka reaffirmed that the Czech Republic sees “the 
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transatlantic bond as the foundation of [its] security policy.”13 Similarly, the 
election of Donald Trump did not fundamentally alter the course of Czech 
policies  toward the United States. Some commentators from the press and 
civil society have criticized the po liti cal program of the new American pres­
ident while, by contrast, Zeman has declared his admiration for it. Overall, 
according to a study comparing EU member states reactions to Donald 
Trump’s election, “the image of the U.S. in the Czech Republic remains 
 little changed.”14
Relations with Rus sia
Rus sia is another impor tant non­ EU actor for Czech foreign policy. On this 
issue, divisions among internal players have been more salient than on re­
lations with the United States. The Czech position has been more complex 
and more nuanced than what is accounted for in international media, where 
the country is depicted  either as irremediably fearful of Rus sia  because of 
its history or as amenable to the Kremlin’s positions  because it is crippled 
from within by Rus sia’s influence.
From an economic point of view, Czech­ Russian relations have been 
steady and consequential. On the po liti cal and rhetorical side, by contrast, 
they have often been rocky. While relations  were good in the years imme­
diately  after the Velvet Revolution, they deteriorated over the question of 
the Czech accession to NATO. A period of cordial normalization followed 
in the early 2000s, but a new period of tension emerged around the Ameri­
can BMD plan and, more broadly, Rus sia’s new assertiveness in regional 
affairs. In 2007, Moscow regularly denounced the BMD scheme and went 
as far as threatening to point its missiles at Prague and Warsaw. Czech poli­
cymakers responded by castigating Rus sia’s ‘neo­ imperial’ attempts to 
regain control of its former sphere of influence. Nevertheless,  these con­
demnations  were mainly rhetorical and very rarely obstructed diplomatic 
channels.
In the Czech Republic, declarations on Rus sia quite often serve, indeed, 
domestic po liti cal objectives. The Rus sian question is highly polarizing in­
ternally, more than in most Eu ro pean countries, and it is thus crucial to 
understand how the vari ous domestic preferences compete and how this 
configuration affects Czech foreign policy. The Atlanticist stream of the 
foreign policy elites, the ODS party, an impor tant share of the mainstream 
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press, and several nongovernmental organ izations (NGOs) and think tanks 
are highly critical of the Kremlin and often pres ent Rus sia as a threat to 
national security. They have often used Rus sia as a straw man in domestic 
po liti cal discourse: The Mirek Topolánek government (2006–09) had, for 
instance, used Rus sia as justification for the BMD proj ect, but also, more 
surprisingly, as a reason to ratify the Lisbon Treaty.15 By contrast, the 
ČSSD, the business community, and a share of the population are more 
inclined, traditionally, to see Rus sia as an economic partner. President 
Zeman for his part sometimes adopts, in a provocative style similar to that 
of his pre de ces sor, positions that are overtly pro­ Kremlin, largely endorsing, 
for instance, Vladimir Putin’s account of the Ukraine crisis. This position 
allows him to appeal to the share of Czech voters who are more posi­
tively inclined  toward Rus sia and demonstrate his in de pen dence from 
the government.
While in the past they  were mainly  shaped by the foreign policy 
elite, Czech policies  toward Moscow have been increasingly influenced 
by domestic po liti cal dynamics; they sometimes seem more dictated by 
 these dynamics than by Rus sia’s actions themselves. The difference be­
tween Prague’s reactions to the Russo­ Georgian conflict of 2008 and to 
the Ukraine crisis of 2014 is particularly illustrative in this regard: Con­
trary to the other EU member states, the Czech Republic  adopted a more 
hawkish position on the former than on the latter. In 2008, Czech govern­
ment elites condemned Rus sia as the aggressor and joined member states 
such as Poland, the Baltic states, and the United Kingdom in demanding 
EU sanctions against Moscow.16 By comparison, neighboring Slovakia, 
whose geographic and historical situation vis­ à­ vis Rus sia is similar to 
that of the Czech Republic,  adopted a dif fer ent stance on the conflict: 
Bratislava pointed to Tbilisi’s responsibility in initiating hostilities and 
joined the group opposed to sanctions (including Germany, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands, and Greece).17 The latter group eventually prevailed, and 
no sanctions  were imposed in 2008.
In 2014, following Rus sia’s annexation of Crimea and its support for 
armed groups in Eastern Ukraine, the EU progressively imposed a set of 
economic sanctions on Rus sia. In the internal EU debates on  these sanc­
tions, the Czech Republic has often counted among the member states 
opposed to  these sanctions or calling for their lifting.18 More specifically, 
Prague has been oscillating between reluctantly supporting sanctions as an 
incarnation of EU unity and implicitly calling them into questions. This 
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lack of clarity stemmed from deep divisions at the highest state level, where 
the three principal figures at the time defended divergent positions, al­
though they  were (or had been) members of the same po liti cal party 
(ČSSD). Then Prime Minister Sobotka had  adopted a reserved attitude 
 toward sanctions, not officially calling for their removal but pointing to 
their negative effects on Czech businesses and seeking specific exemptions. 
Then Foreign Minister Lubomir Zaorálek and his team had been the most 
critical of Rus sia and advocated sanctions in the name of the EU main­
stream. Fi nally, President Zeman has called for the lifting of sanctions, 
presenting the conflict in Ukraine as a “civil war” in which Rus sia was not 
involved.19 Outside the governing circle, the ODS and most of the media 
have called for tougher sanctions and military cooperation with Ukraine, 
while the Czech citizenry sees the Ukraine crisis as a threat to Eu ro pean 
security but remains divided on the issue of sanctions.20
In reviewing  these positions, it is impor tant however to distinguish be­
tween rhetorical posturing and concrete policy decisions: President Zeman 
might be a vocal critic of sanctions and regularly expresses his views at home 
and abroad, but when the Czech Republic has to vote in the Eu ro pean 
Council on the continuation of EU sanctions on Rus sia, the decision rests 
with the government.
Priorities and Niches in the eU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy: The Case of the eastern Neighborhood
In the early 2000s, promoting further EU enlargement eastward ranked 
high among the foreign policy priorities of the Czech Republic and other 
Central Eu ro pean member states. The rhetorical commitment to that ob­
jective remains— the Czech 2011 foreign policy white book (Conceptual Basis 
of the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic) listed, for instance, “strengthening 
the Eu ro pean integration of Eastern Eu rope” as one of the country’s pri­
ority inside the EU— but the  actual level of engagement in realizing has 
largely faded. Not only is the prospect of such enlargement increasingly un­
likely in the medium term, in light of both the EU’s internal dynamics and 
of the regional context, but Visegrad countries have themselves become 
much less warm to the idea.21 This is especially true of the Czech Republic.
In the late 2000s, as EU membership was not readily available for states 
like Moldova or Ukraine, the Visegrad countries invested instead in the 
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eastern dimension of the Eu ro pean Neighborhood Policy (ENP). More spe­
cifically, they supported the creation and development of the Eastern Part­
nership (EaP), a program that aims at fostering the economic integration 
and po liti cal association of six post­ Soviet states with the EU.22 Poland, in 
par tic u lar, played a crucial role in providing the conceptual basis for the 
policy and in working  toward its adoption at the EU level, supported in that 
endeavor by the other Visegrad countries. The Central Eu ro pean invest­
ment in the EaP has been serving multiple goals. Being geo graph i cally close 
to— and retaining historical, socioeconomic, and societal links with— the 
post­ Soviet neighborhood, Central Eu ro pean countries have an acute in­
terest in the region’s stability and economic development. In addition, the 
effort by Central Eu ro pean member states to tip the ENP geopo liti cal spot­
light eastward has also been serving intra­ EU objectives: It is a means to 
carve for themselves a niche of specialization within the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) structures and thereby to increase their agenda­ 
setting capacities in Brussels. The Visegrad countries can indeed claim a 
certain expertise both on the post­ Soviet region and on the pro cess of 
demo cratic transition.
In the case of the Czech Republic, the diplomatic attention to, and 
EU­ level activism for, the Eastern neighborhood has been unequal how­
ever.23 The region, with the exception of Belarus, was largely bereft of 
Prague’s foreign policy radar  until the mid­2000s. Prague’s reaction to the 
2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine was very limited, for instance. In 2007, 
however, the Czech Republic presented in the framework of the Visegrad 
Group a proposal on how to develop an eastern pillar within the ENP.24 
 Later on, it supported the Polish initiatives that led to the creation of the 
EaP, which was in fact launched in Prague in May 2009  under the aegis of 
the Czech EU presidency. Two  factors prompted this new foreign policy 
activism  toward the Eastern neighborhood. First, this new diplomatic pri­
ority was successfully pushed internally by policy entrepreneurs from the 
Atlanticist foreign policy elite and the NGO sector: The former saw it as a 
mean to roll back Rus sia’s influence in the Eastern neighborhood and the 
latter as a way to promote democracy in the region.25 Second, the Czech 
Republic was keen to find a flagship proj ect for its EU Council Presidency 
role in 2009 and in increasing its specialization and influence within EU 
structures more generally. The influence of  these two  factors is confirmed 
by the fact that with the Czech EU presidency being over and the internal 
influence of the Atlanticist foreign policy elite receding, Prague’s diplomatic 
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attention and level of activism  toward the region has diminished. In that 
sense, Czech foreign policy seems more closely aligned than before with 
the attitude of the population: 62  percent of Czechs oppose, indeed, fur­
ther EU enlargement.26
Conclusion
During the 2000s, the Czech foreign policy pro cess was largely deserted 
by the po liti cal class once NATO and EU accession  were achieved. In that 
de cade, as noted by a long­ term observer of Czech politics, foreign policy 
has never been among the top­ five priorities of any of the successive gov­
erning co ali tions.27 Instead, diplomatic and strategic elites played a key role 
in shaping the policy choices of the country.
As this chapter has shown with reference to Czech policies  toward the 
United States, Rus sia, and the Eastern neighborhood, this state of affairs 
has recently been somehow reversed, however. The foreign policy elite is 
no longer able to steer Czech foreign policy as it used to, and the influence 
of its Atlanticist branch in par tic u lar has decreased. Conversely, domestic 
po liti cal considerations and partisan infighting have increasingly affected 
foreign policy decisions. This is salient not just in the three issue areas ana­
lyzed, but also with regard to Czech EU policies. For instance, out going 
Foreign Minister Zaorálek, who since 2014 had been regarded as one of 
moderate and pro­ European voices on the Czech po liti cal scene, engaged 
in March 2017 in an unexpected rant against the EU and its institutions—
in all likelihood  because of upcoming elections and to be in a better posi­
tion to compete with the populist­ leaning President Zeman and Andrej 
Babis, the current prime minister.28 Czech commentators abundantly crit­
icized his declarations, pointing out that they risked weakening the coun­
try’s position in the EU by conveying an image of unpredictability and 
short­ termism.
Foreign policy cannot, obviously, be summed up—or simply grasped— 
based on rhetorical statements. Several Czech initiatives at the EU could 
be mentioned, and more generally, Prague’s balancing act—at once using 
the Visegrad Group as a punctual co ali tion platform on certain topics and 
avoiding association with the governments in power in Warsaw and 
Budapest— shows that it increasingly conceptualizes its national interests 
in Eu ro pean terms. What is more, the politicization of Czech foreign policy 
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amounts, in fact, to a normalization to a certain extent. The conditions in 
which Havel laid the groundwork for Czech foreign policy, as well as his 
aura and vision,  were exceptional. The momentum following the Czech 
Republic’s accession to the EU and NATO, in which Atlanticist policy 
entrepreneurs  were able to tilt the country’s foreign policy in a certain di­
rection, took place in a markedly dif fer ent Eu ro pean and international 
contexts. For the Czech Republic, as for all the other member states, the 
choices to be made at the EU level are much more pressing now than a 
de cade ago. Following the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump, 
Atlanticism has lost much of its shine and operability in this context, at 
least in the way it was previously defined.
The structural influence of domestic politics on foreign policy is common 
to any country; emphasizing it simply invites one to pay closer attention to 
po liti cal parties and to how they relate to foreign policy  matters. The lack 
of schooling and vision of the po liti cal class in international affairs is 
hardly a pattern confined to the Czech Republic. What appears more detri­
mental in the case of the Czech Republic and several other Eu ro pean 
countries, though, is the absence of a po liti cal party setting forward a posi­
tive agenda and, most impor tant, a sense of owner ship about the EU.
NOTES
1. See “EU Takes Action against Eastern States for Refusing to Take 
Refugees,” The Guardian, June 13, 2017.
2. This is the main conclusion of the 2016 edition of an annual assessment 
of Czech foreign policy conducted by a local think tank. Vít Dostál and Ter­
eza Jermanová, eds., Agenda for Czech Foreign Policy 2017 (Prague: Asociace pro 
Mezinárodní Otázky/AMO, 2017).
3. “Interview: Confusing Czech Foreign Policy Worries Allies,” Eu ro pean 
Security Journal, May 25, 2017 (www . esjnews . com / interview ­ karel ­ kovanda).
4. On Havel’s ideas and on its imprint on Czech foreign policy, see 
Jacques Rupnik, “In Praise of Václav Havel,” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 3 
(2010), pp. 135–42; Ondřej Ditrych, Vladimír Handl, Nik Hynek, and Vít 
Střítecký, “Understanding Havel?,” Communist and Post- Communist Studies 
46, no. 3 (2013), pp. 407–17; Rick Fawn, “Symbolism in the Diplomacy of 
Czech President Vaclav Havel,” East Eu ro pean Quarterly 33, no.  1 (1999), 
pp. 1–19.
5. David Cadier and Kristina Mikulova, “Eu ro pean Endowment for De­
mocracy: Institutionalizing Central and Eastern Eu ro pean democracy pro­
motion model at the EU level?,” in Democ ratization of EU Foreign Policy? The 
10-3280-8-ch10.indd   213 15/11/18   3:40 AM
214 DaviD CaDieR
-1—
0—
+1—
Role of New Member States, edited by B. Berti, K. Mikulova and N. Popescu 
(Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 2015), pp. 83–101.
6. Dostál and Jermanová, Agenda for Czech Foreign Policy 2017, p. 14.
7. Jacques Rupnik, “Amer i ca’s Best Friends in Eu rope: East­ Central Eu ro­
pean Perceptions and Policies  towards the U.S.,” in With US or Against US: 
Studies in Global Anti- Americanism, edited by Tony Judt and Denis Lacorne 
(New York: Palgrave, 2005), p. 99.
 8. See Nikola Hynek and Vít Střitecký, “The Rise and Fall of the Third 
Site of Ballistic Missile Defense,” Communist and Post- Communist Studies 43, 
no. 2 (2010), pp. 179–87.
 9. David Cadier, “Après le retour à l’Eu rope: convergences et contrastes 
dans les politiques étrangères des pays d’Eu rope centrale [ After the Return to 
Eu rope: Convergences and Contrasts in the Foreign Policies of Central Eu ro­
pean Countries],” Politique Etrangère 3 (September 2012), pp. 573–84.
10. “An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and 
Eastern Eu rope,” Gazeta Wyborcza, July 16, 2009. Neither Vondra nor Schwar­
zenberg  were in power at the time of the letter’s publication, but both resumed 
key governmental positions just a few months  after (as minister of defense and 
minister of foreign affairs, respectively).
11. “Slovak PM Follows Czechs in Ruling Out Foreign NATO Troops,” 
 Reuters, June 4, 2014.
12. “PM Draws Fire for Saying Czech Republic  Will Not Call for NATO 
Troop Increase,” Radio Prague, June 4, 2014.
13. Bohuslav Sobotka, “Beyond Ukraine: NATO Solidarity in a Time of 
Crisis,” Foreign Policy, August 18, 2014.
14. Jeremy Shapiro and Dina Pardijs, “The Transatlantic Meaning of 
Donald Trump: A U.S.­ EU Power Audit,” Eu ro pean Council on Foreign Relations 
(ECFR) Power Audit (September 2017), p. 19.
15. “Czechs Must Choose Lisbon or Rus sia, says PM Topolánek,” Radio 
Prague, November 20, 2008.
16. Karel Schwarzenberg, “Ruská invaze je zlom,” Respekt, August  18, 
2008.
17. Cadier, “Après le retour à l’Eu rope.”
18. Richard Youngs, Eu rope’s Eastern Crisis: The Geopolitics of Asymmetry 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 72 and 95.
19. “Putin’s Ally in Prague  Castle,” EUobserver, February 16, 2015.
20. In a Public Opinion Research Centre (CVVM) poll conducted in Octo­
ber 2014, 73  percent of the respondents characterized the Ukraine crisis as a 
risk for Eu ro pean security, 41  percent supported EU sanctions on Rus sia, while 
39  percent disagreed with them. See Jan Adamec, “Less than Half of Czechs 
Agree with the Sanctions against Rus sia, Says the Latest CVVM Survey,” 
Visegrad Revue, October 24, 2014.
10-3280-8-ch10.indd   214 15/11/18   3:40 AM
 The Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic 215
—-1
—0
—+1
21. Vladimir Bilčik, “Foreign Policy in Post­ Communist EU,” Interna-
tional Issues and Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs 19, no. 4 (2010), pp. 3–17.
22. The six countries concerned are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine.
23. Petr Kratochvíl and Ondřej Horký, “Eastern Promises? Czech Ambi­
guity in the Eu ro pean Neighbourhood,” in The Quest for the National Interest: 
A Methodological Reflection on Czech Foreign Policy, edited by P. Drulák and 
M. Braun (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang AG Internationaler Verlag der Wis­
senschaften, 2010), pp. 71–86.
24. Elsa Tulmets, “Preparing the EU Presidency: The Czech Contribution 
to the Proj ect of ‘Eastern Partnership,’ ” Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 
4 (2008), p. 79–98.
25. David Cadier and Monika Sus, “Modalities of Think tanks’ Involve­
ment in Foreign Policy Making: A Comparative Analy sis of the Czech Repub­
lic and Poland,” The International Spectator 52, no. 1 (March 2017), pp. 116–31.
26. EU Commission, “Eu ro pe ans’ Views on the Priorities of the Eu ro pean 
Union,” Eurobarometer 86 survey, December  2016 (http:// ec . europa . eu 
/ COMMFrontOffice / publicopinion / index . cfm / Survey / getSurveyDetail 
/ instruments / STANDARD / surveyKy / 2137).
27. Martin Ehl, “Letter from Prague,” Car ne gie Eu rope, January 30, 2015 
(http:// carnegieeurope . eu / strategiceurope / ? fa​=​58860).
28. “Zaorálek: Volný pohyb osob za prací v EU musíme mít pod kontrolou 
[Zaorálek: The  Free Movement of Workers in the EU Must Be Regulated],” 
Hospodářské noviny, March 20, 2017.
10-3280-8-ch10.indd   215 15/11/18   3:40 AM
